Throughout a year-long conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, a relentless media war rages on as well, especially on social media platforms. Both sides deployed electronic armies to propagate their war agendas, intensifying the battle beyond the battlefield.
After the conflict broke out in Sudan a year ago between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, both parties started spreading a lot of false and misleading information in the media and on social media. They did this to strengthen their propaganda about the war or the political situation, and to create misinformation to avoid responsibility for the human rights violations that resulted from the ongoing battle between them.
One year following the commencement of the war in Sudan, this report delves into the concerted efforts of the involved parties and their internal and external supporters to shape Sudanese public opinion. Additionally, it sheds light on the extensive impact of the deliberate disinformation campaigns orchestrated by the parties on both Sudanese and international public sentiment.
Efforts to sway public opinion in Sudan started immediately after the conflict began. Both sides traded accusations regarding who was responsible for starting the war and claimed control of the territory. The official channels of the warring parties spread false and misleading information, leading to the formation of online propaganda campaigns.
This inconsistency has laid a solid foundation for the disinformation campaigns observed in the Sudanese digital space over the past year of war. It has significantly shaped the media and propaganda narratives of the parties involved.
The War propaganda
In every war, there is a specific media narrative that is designed to boost the morale of soldiers and address the concerns of supporters. Both sides involved in the conflict have their online propaganda machines to promote their position. This often involves creating false and misleading information that does not accurately represent the reality of the situation on the ground.
On April 15 last year, during the first day of fighting, the official Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces platforms released conflicting and misleading information about the control on the ground. This marked the beginning of a fertile environment for disinformation networks to operate.
On the same day, several pro-Sudanese Armed Forces accounts shared videos on social media praising the army for “conducting airstrikes on the headquarters of the Rapid Support Forces, seizing large amounts of cash from Daglo’s house, and launching airstrikes in the northern part of the country.” However, it was later discovered that the footage was old and originated from Yemen and Libya, and some of it was from video games.
Similarly, accounts that are advocating for the Rapid Support circulated videos of Sudanese Armed Forces fighter jets that were supposedly shot down by the Rapid Support in the battle. However, after verification, it was discovered that the videos were outdated, as the fighter jets had been downed in the combat operations in Syria.
The Beam team observed that disinformation activities regarding control and progress on the ground tend to occur simultaneously with battles between the parties. Additionally, a group of accounts that support both parties play a significant role in spreading this information to a wide audience.
For example, Nyala, the capital of South Darfur State, experienced a prolonged and bloody war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces and as a result, the Rapid Support Forces took over the city in October.
During the battles, a group of pro-Sudanese Armed Forces accounts posted a misleading picture showing RSF soldiers fleeing Nyala. On the same day, before the Rapid Support Forces took control of the headquarters of the Sudanese Army’s 16th Battalion in Nyala, pro-army accounts published fabricated content related to the Jeddah talks between the two parties. They stated that the army withdrew from the negotiations due to the Rapid Support attack on Nyala.
By verifying these allegations, we have concluded that the image was old and not from Sudan, it was confirmed that it has nothing to do with the events taking place there.
By examining the claim that the army was withdrawing from the Jeddah negotiations, we found that the negotiations were still ongoing at the time, and the army had not withdrawn from them.
During the battles in Nyala, as well as in the battles of Al-Jazeera and Wad Madani, a disinformation campaign was underway. Alongside the fighting, numerous accounts and pages were spreading war propaganda and false information related to the battles in Al-Jazeera.
The Political Narrative of War
During the war, both parties shared their perspectives. The Forces of Freedom and Change accused the dissolved National Congress Party and the Sudanese Islamic Movement of starting the war. However, the Sudanese Islamic Movement denied these allegations in its statement titled “Allegations of Warmongering.” The movement claimed that it was not involved in starting the war and instead took responsibility for establishing the Forces of the Framework Agreement. Furthermore, it expressed its support for the army and its willingness to fight alongside the army if requested.
The divergence in narratives from political forces about the reality of the war created a fertile environment for political disinformation. This allowed all political and military parties to engage in an active disinformation campaign, which strengthened their narratives while attacking their political opponents.
Since the war broke out a year ago, the Beam team has produced several reports that have been identified as “fabricated and misleading,” which target political and military leaders.
For instance, the Beam observatory team noticed an effort to influence public opinion by creating false information that targeted the armed forces and their political supporters, while excluding the Rapid Support Forces. Our team also found a lot of misleading and fabricated information being spread by platforms supporting the Rapid Support Forces and criticizing the armed forces and their supporters.
On the other hand, since the fighting broke out, our team has been monitoring numerous accounts and pages, some of which claim to be media institutions. All of these platforms support the Sudanese Armed Forces and are spreading disinformation aimed at the leaders of the Rapid Support and the leaders of the democratic civil forces (Taqaddam).
Misinformation as a way to cover up human rights violations
During the war, both sides engaged in disinformation operations beyond the battlefield and political sphere. They spread misinformation alongside events that involved human rights violations, aiming to avoid accountability by inundating the digital space with false information.
For example, last January, the Sudanese Armed Forces bombed the city of Nyala. Media reported that the bombing targeted civilian neighborhoods, including “Airport District and Texas District,” as well as the Immunization Center, Shafaqir Hospital, and the doctors’ quarters in the city’s main market area. The bombing resulted in civilian casualties and injuries of varying degrees.
Simultaneously, several websites, accounts, and pages supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces claimed that the army destroyed an Emirati cargo plane carrying supplies for the Rapid Support Forces near Nyala.
Our team verified the claim and found it to be misleading; the army bombed the city that morning but did not bomb an Emirati cargo plane. Instead, it bombed healthcare facilities and residential neighborhoods, causing death and injuries among civilians.
It seems that the accounts that published the allegation may want to cover up these violations, as the widespread publication process coincided with the occurrence of these violations.
Similarly, the Rapid Support Forces use the same methods to hold the Sudanese Armed Forces responsible for bombing civilian facilities.
For instance, the Rapid Support Forces took control of Gezira State in central Sudan last December, and in the following months, the Sudanese Armed Forces moved to retake the city, engaging in battles with the Rapid Support Forces on the outskirts of Gezira and some of its villages. The Resistance Committees in Madani and other human rights organizations reported that the Rapid Support Forces committed violations against civilians.
In this context, several accounts and platforms supporting the Rapid Support Forces posted an image on April 6 showing a burnt building, claiming it belonged to Gezira University and was destroyed by the army.
Our team verified the authenticity of the picture, which we found to be fabricated, as it was created through artificial intelligence. However, this information came in conjunction with the continuation of confrontations in Al-Jazeera State, where the Rapid Support is accused of committing a series of violations against the civilian population.
These accounts appear to work systematically to accuse the Sudanese Armed Forces of bombing civilian facilities or to evade their violations and blame their opponent.
The Old and Renewed Methods of Creating Disinformation
The Sudanese digital space has known disinformation operations since early on during the rule of the ousted President, Omar Al-Bashir, where he founded the General Intelligence Service (the National Intelligence and Security Service) previously known as the (Electronic Jihad Unit) whose mission was to collect information on political activists opposed to the regime and target Sudanese public opinion.
With the development of political events and the changes that have taken place in the country, the Beam Observatory reports database indicates that parties within the country, including the Sudanese army, rapid support Forces, the General Intelligence Service, parties that have Islamic orientation, and parties opposed to the military rule, are active in the Sudanese digital space and spread false and misleading information.
The mentioned parties initially followed traditional methods and old tactics, such as fabricating statements and redesigning them in frame images for global channels like Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, then attributing them to political and civilian leaders. Other methods include reposting old video clips as if they were recent and posting photos and videos from other countries, claiming they were from Sudan.
With the advancement of technology and the advent of artificial intelligence, the conflicting parties have resorted to new methods using AI techniques to replicate the real voices of military and political leaders and fabricate content that serves the warring parties’ narratives.
A Beam Observatory report noted that several accounts supporting the Rapid Support Forces on the X platform posted fake audio created through AI targeting the Sudanese Armed Forces leader. Interestingly, this content was first posted by British journalists’ accounts on the X platform that supports Israel and normalization between Israel and the UAE. The content was also shared by Sudanese politicians and platforms supporting the Rapid Support Forces.
Similarly, an account on Twitter posted content it confirmed was fabricated, and upon examination, we found it was that over 97% of the content was generated by AI. The audio clip claims to be a conversation between leaders of (Taqaddum) and the Rapid Support Forces commander, posted by Sudan’s national television and other sites and accounts supporting the Sudanese Army, claiming it was a conversation between Hemeti, former Minister of Cabinet Affairs Khalid Omar Yousuf, and the leader of the Democratic Movement of the SPLM, Yasir Arman, planning to seize power by force on April 15 of the previous year.
Based on the above, it is clear that both warring parties in Sudan, alongside their battles on the ground, are also waging another war on social media platforms. They use various disinformation weapons to enhance their war propaganda or attack their political and military opponents, employing more advanced methods than before to gain internal and external support, influence local and international public opinion, or evade responsibility for the human rights violations resulting from their ongoing war.
As the conflict reaches its first year, these actors are still highly active within the Sudanese digital space, in an attempt to guide public opinion and influence real information related to the continuation of the war or ways to stop it.
