Social media is primarily intended to provide a platform for the free expression of opinions. However, governments can also use it to propagate political propaganda and influence public opinion.
Many local, regional, and international parties utilize disinformation operations as a political weapon to further their agendas and achieve political, economic, or military goals. This is well-documented by the Beam Observatory network and reports from international institutions and major technology companies.
After publishing a previous report on a disinformation network that promotes the interests of the UAE and attacks Sudanese political forces on Twitter, the (Beam Reports) team observed a similar information campaign on Twitter. This campaign targeted public opinion in various Arab and African countries and was influenced by the disinformation network mentioned in the previous report.
This network aims to boost the UAE’s role in the region as a promoter of peace. It supports political regimes, entities, and individuals loyal to Abu Dhabi while also targeting individuals and groups associated with political Islam or holding positions that oppose the UAE’s political stance in the region.
The network of accounts related to the information process mentioned in this report is active in Sudan, Tunisia, Mauritania, Yemen, and Libya.
Sudan
In February, the Beam team released an investigation into a disinformation network that promotes the UAE’s interests while attacking political forces in Sudan. Our team noted new activities on Twitter within this network, where retweets in the Sudanese digital space seek to confuse public opinion and enhance Abu Dhabi’s relations with the military regime in Khartoum, using the hashtag #Sudan_in_the_heart_of_the_UAE. The network posts content claiming that the UAE supports reconciliation, peace, and stability in Sudan, accompanied by pictures of the President of the United Arab Emirates (Mohammed bin Zayed) and the commander of the Sudanese army (Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan).
To enhance the reputation of Abu Dhabi’s allies, a social media campaign was launched using the hashtag (#al-Burhan_in_the_UAE) to coincide with the visit of army commander (Abdul Fattah al-Burhan) to the UAE in February of this year. During this time, various accounts posted numerous tweets highlighting the strong Sudanese-Emirati relations and emphasizing the UAE’s significant support for Sudan and its commitment to promoting reconciliation and stability.
The Beam team noted that a number of the network’s constituent accounts had earlier been active in a systematic attack on civil-political forces in Sudan. On the contrary, these accounts posted positive content via tweets that included pictures of the army commander in Sudan, which appeared to support the military coup forces in Sudan.
After the outbreak of war in Sudan on April 15, the Beam Observatory team published an investigation showing a resurgence of activity on a network of accounts through numerous tweets targeting Sudanese public opinion. These tweets promoted the interests of the UAE, utilized media propaganda in favor of the Rapid Support Forces, and attacked the Sudanese army.
Tunisia
In Tunisia, there is an active network of social media accounts that have been posting numerous tweets attacking Tunisian political figures and organizations while also expressing support for others. Our team has discovered that this network primarily focuses its activity on targeting the Tunisian Ennahda movement and its leader, Rached Ghannouchi, by attempting to link the movement’s actions to those of the Muslim Brotherhood. Additionally, the Accounts Network posts content that supports the policies of Tunisian President Kais Saied and promotes Abu Dhabi’s propaganda in favor of stability for the Arab people.
Yemen.
As mentioned in the previous Beam Observatory report, a network of accounts promoting the agenda of the UAE launched attacks on the Houthi Ansar Allah group on Twitter.
During our search for the said network, the Beam Observatory team monitored ongoing activities and numerous tweets from certain accounts. These accounts promoted Abu Dhabi’s policies in the Republic of Yemen and criticized the Houthi Ansar Allah group.
Mauritania
In the digital space of the State of Mauritania, the Beam Observatory team monitored the activity of a network of accounts through numerous tweets. These tweets attacked political organizations and figures while also supporting other political organizations and promoting Abu Dhabi’s role in Nouakchott as a supporter of Mauritanians.
In the same context, upon searching the accounts mentioned above, our team noticed activity in March of this year. The accounts published numerous tweets attacking the politician and human rights activist Biram Ould Dah Abeid, who is the head of the Initiative for the Resurgence of the Abolitionist Movement. The tweets stated that Biram seeks to destabilize security and stability in Mauritania by exploiting his political position.
In November 2022, the Beam Observatory team observed some tweets promoting the achievements of the current Mauritanian president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani. Additionally, the team noted that some tweets emphasized the unity of interests between the Emirati and Mauritanian people, highlighting the honest, loving, and brotherly relations between the two countries. This was also evident in the accompanying pictures.
Libya
In the Libyan digital space, the Beam Observatory team monitored the network’s activity through several tweets promoting Abu Dhabi’s role in supporting security and stability in the Libyan Republic, through which it attacked political figures.
Our team also observed that the accounts posted some tweets promoting the UAE’s positive role in Libya, aiming to unite the ranks and reunite the political parties in the country.
As explained in the images below.
Network Attributes
The network comprises numerous accounts grouped by common features, with other attributes varying based on network activity.
General features of the network:
- Most accounts interact with each other by following, liking, and retweeting
- Most accounts have portraits of girls hiding their facial features.
- Most of the accounts are old and were created between 2009-2014, and tweets and activity were generally deleted before 2022.
- Most accounts write their tweets in standard Arabic, and the content is uniform for most of the accounts.
- Most accounts are highly active and tweet daily.
- Most accounts have a similar number of tweets, with the majority of users having between 1,000 and 1,500 tweets.
- Most accounts retweet and engage with genuine accounts.
- Most of the accounts in the network use non-Arabic names, and some have poor English.
Identified Themes:
The network comprises numerous accounts grouped by common features, with other attributes varying based on network activity.
General features of the network:
- Most accounts interact with each other by following, liking, and retweeting
- Most accounts have portraits of girls hiding their facial features.
- Most of the accounts are old and were created between 2009-2014, and tweets and activity were generally deleted before 2022.
- Most accounts write their tweets in standard Arabic, and the content is uniform for most of the accounts.
- Most accounts are highly active and tweet daily.
- Most accounts have a similar number of tweets, with the majority of users having between 1,000 and 1,500 tweets.
- Most accounts retweet and engage with genuine accounts.
- Most of the accounts in the network use non-Arabic names, and some have poor English.
No | Account Name: | twitter ID | No | Account Name | twitter ID |
1 | 34750094 | 26 | 228063155 | ||
2 | 53597973 | 27 | 2302535203 | ||
3 | 53919172 | 28 | 1649019216 | ||
4 | 57469360 | 29 | 1162114886 | ||
5 | 362546972 | 30 | 49500734 | ||
6 | 451714877 | 31 | 100217446 | ||
7 | 545899672 | 32 | 217471790 | ||
8 | 607348316 | 33 | 801481434 | ||
9 | 1347036890 | 34 | 2582521092 | ||
10 | 732134190 | 35 | 2953013017 | ||
11 | 2346562762 | 36 | 91327172 | ||
12 | 2917480855 | 37 | 44388844 | ||
13 | 552805181 | 38 | 4445026033 | ||
14 | 763981998742384640 | 39 | 79137078 | ||
15 | 770654562 | 40 | 98780583 | ||
16 | 1649019216 | 41 | 62090115 | ||
17 | 49500734 | 42 | 3314813864 | ||
18 | 27101426 | 43 | 4479788061 | ||
19 | 2934480662 | 44 | 501058338 | ||
20 | 54843837 | 45 | 455209005 | ||
21 | 3014116489 | 46 | 71509177 | ||
22 | 217471790 | 47 | 76759267 | ||
23 | 1168206834 | 48 | 850767480708640769 | ||
24 | 189772048 | 49 | 24905696 | ||
25 | 420006869 | 50 | 2431434175 |
