At the Chadian border, intermediaries, brokers and companies receive the gold smuggled from the Jebel Amer mines in North Darfur, the Agbash mines, and more than ten other mines in the Songo area in South Darfur state in western Sudan then, they take it to the cities of Abéché and Adré, and from there to N’Djamena, where official documents are issued for it as Chadian gold before it is exported via N’Djamena airport to Dubai airport, making the United Arab Emirates its final destination,” says (Mohammed) – a pseudonym to Beam Reports. A Sudanese gold trader with extensive connections to the Sudanese government and governments in neighboring countries, who has visited most of the country’s gold mines and personally took part in numerous smuggling trips, in a lengthy interview with Beam Reports as part of an investigation it conducted on the routes of Sudan’s gold smuggling and its final destination during two years of chaos under a destructive war.
Gold in Sudan fuels fierce competition between the government and armed groups in all corners of this African country, which is being torn apart by a bloody war that has entered its third year, where gold was – and still is – one of the most prominent sources of its funding.
After the secession of South Sudan in July 2011 and the loss of more than two-thirds of the oil with the new country, Sudan began to double its gold production and rely on it in an attempt to make up for the loss of black gold (oil).
Within a few years, gold became a major resource and a significant source for supplying the public treasury with billions of dollars. However, the country did not benefit from it greatly due to the large and widespread smuggling operations that occur either through the country’s official outlets like airports and land or sea border ports, or through secret smuggling operations from mines scattered across the north, west, east, and south of the country, These include areas under government control or armed groups, as political and military division after the war led to the redivision and redrawing of Sudan’s gold mines – and the country itself – based on the map of military control of the warring parties, especially the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
This new military map of control over the gold mines led us to trace the routes of its smuggling, where we were able – through knowledgeable sources – to identify the active smuggling routes in the north, east, southwest, and west of the country, which are connected to four of Sudan’s neighboring countries: Chad, South Sudan, Egypt, and Libya, in addition to two regional neighbors – Kenya and Uganda – while the United Arab Emirates represents the final destination for most of the gold smuggled from Sudan.
The investigation also revealed that most of the mentioned countries doubled their gold exports during the two years of war, in contrast to the decline in Sudan’s official gold exports.
It seems that the growing gold smuggling operations during the two years of war have finally alarmed the Sudanese government. On April 26, 2025, the Director of Sudanese Customs, Salah Ahmed Ibrahim, announced a “tight plan” that includes monitoring the country’s ports and crossings using drones and modern equipments, during his meeting with the Director-General of the Sudanese Mineral Resources Limited Company, Mohamed Tahir Omar, confirming the ability of customs forces to thwart smuggling operations.
The Armed gold smuggling operations in Darfur, western Sudan, are carried out through vast networks that include armed men, international intermediaries, brokers, and companies, where smugglers follow complex routes amidst significant risks.
Armed men on motorcycles carry the smuggled Sudanese gold from South Darfur to El Geneina in West Darfur, and from there to Adré in Chad through several crossings. There, on both sides of the border, traders and intermediaries move in armed four-wheel-drive vehicles, and others also cross into Chadian territory under the protection of armed elements from the Rapid Support Forces in a paid service,” says (Mohammed).
He adds, “Smugglers also arrive from the Jebel Amer mines in North Darfur through Kornoi and other small areas via complex, armed-protected routes to Chadian territory, which is crowded with brokers, Chadian and foreign companies such as Emirati companies. Once they receive the smuggled gold, they go to Abéché, then to the capital N’Djamena, and from its airport to Dubai airport in the United Arab Emirates”.
The Songo area in South Darfur also represents a second route for gold smuggling to South Sudan.
Songo hosts several mines, in addition to the Kafia Kingi area on the border with South Sudan, where gold is smuggled amidst high security chaos on its journey to Juba, the capital of South Sudan, and from there to Kenya and Uganda.
Darfur is not alone; in areas of South Kordofan under the control of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North, led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, gold smuggling operations are also active from traditional mining sites to several foreign destinations.
As for northern Sudan, the old desert smuggling routes used for human trafficking are being used to smuggle gold, starting from the Abuhamad area – the largest gold market – on routes well-known to smugglers, leading to the Egyptian border, whether in Shalateen, which is occupied by Cairo, or near the Argeen crossing or Aswan.
On both sides of the Sudanese-Egyptian border, smugglers dismount from their vehicles, backed by a pre-arranged security protection network, where the guides await them with taxis. Then they cross into Egyptian territory loaded with Sudan’s gold.
As for eastern Sudan, in Port Sudan at the far northeastern tip of the country, traders deliver their gold in the local market, and it does not take long before the smugglers deliver it to them in Aswan, Egypt.
This is what Sudan’s gold looks like after two years of war — controlled by cross-border networks of vested interests, gleaming in foreign countries that falsely claim it as their own.
From Oil to Gold: Transformations in the Sudanese Economy After the Separation
The secession of South Sudan in July 2011 dealt a heavy blow to the Sudanese economy, as Sudan lost about 70% of its oil reserves, estimated at approximately 6 billion barrels, which were located in the South. Since oil extraction began during President Jaafar Nimeiri’s era (1969–1985), oil became the main source of funding for the public budget and represented the country’s primary export. In 2011, oil accounted for 75.6% of Sudan’s exports, generating $7.3 billion in revenue.
But after the separation, oil exports declined in 2012 to only $955 million, leading to a drop in total export revenues to $3.4 billion compared to $9.7 billion the previous year.
Figure No (1): The Contribution of Gold and Oil Exports to the Balance of Payments (2011–2024)
Figure 1 shows the contribution of gold exports in comparison to oil exports to Sudan’s balance of payments between 2011 and 2024. The balance of payments is a statistical record that tracks the flow of funds generated from trade and financial transactions between Sudan and the rest of the world during a specific period.
The figure shows the sharp decline in oil exports reaching just 0.85% of total exports by 2021, while gold maintained relatively stable levels during the same period, making it the primary source of foreign currency after 2011.
Accordingly, the state turned to enhancing gold production to compensate for the oil loss and cover the foreign exchange deficit.
Figure (2) shows the rise in gold production between 2012 and 2017, peaking in 2015 at 1073 tons, which placed Sudan as the third-largest gold producer in Africa.
Smuggling and Currency Collapse: Reasons Behind the Decline Despite Abundant Production
Sudan’s growth in gold production did not last long. Starting in 2018, gold production saw a sharp decline, reaching only 35.7 tons in 2020—the lowest level since 2011. This sudden drop raised many questions, especially after the Ministry of Minerals revealed in August 2018 that the loss from gold production during the first half of the year amounted to 48.8 tons.
In a report published by Sky News, then-Minister of Minerals Mohamed Ahmed Ali stated that the Central Bank of Sudan had purchased only 10% of the quantity produced during June and July and lacked effective outlets in the production areas. Major General Tareq Shukri, an official in the Economic Security Authority, also noted that the loss in gold production was “large,” calling for it to be addressed rather than focusing solely on increasing production.Although smuggling operations existed before 2018, the worsening currency crisis and the devaluation of the Sudanese pound by 63.8% in that same year pushed traditional miners to smuggle gold to obtain better prices on the parallel market, compared to the official dollar rate they were obliged to accept from the Central Bank of Sudan. In the absence of oversight and a functioning mechanism to account for the produced gold, Sudan lost nearly 50% of its gold production in 2019, and the decline continued in the following years without returning to previous production levels.
Figure No (2): This figure illustrates gold production and gold exports from 2011 to 2023, highlighting the relationship between the two indicators. On average, Sudan exported around 33% of its gold production between 2011 and 2018. This proportion rose to approximately 61% during the period from 2019 to 2021.
Impact of War and Recovery Attempts: An Overview of the Gold Sector in 2024
The situation worsened with the outbreak of war on April 15, 2023, which further exacerbated existing economic crises. A report titled “Developments in the Sudanese Economy in 2023”, issued by the Central Bank of Sudan, indicated that the economic growth rate dropped to -18.3%, compared to -2.5% in 2022. The report considered the “disruption of local and regional supply chains, and the impact on the production and export of natural resources such as gold” among the main reasons for this decline.
Despite these challenges, signs of hope appeared in January 2025, when the Minister of Finance announced that Sudan produced 64 tons of gold in 2024. While this figure does not match the production levels of 2013–2018, it is considered a positive start toward halting the deterioration.
Mohamed Taher Omer, the Director General of the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company, stated that this increase is due to facilitating procedures for companies working in the gold sector through a unified window to reduce bureaucracy and lower imposed fees. The state also announced reducing concession fees to 18% and reprocessing fees for mining residues to 20%, with the aim of supporting formal companies.
Nevertheless, challenges remain. Omer acknowledged that 48% of gold exports are still outside official channels, highlighting the need for increased oversight, activation of government outlets to purchase gold from traditional miners, the use of modern technologies to combat smuggling, and opening of monitoring offices at crossings and airports located in safe zones.
Gold smuggling in Sudan remains one of the state’s most pressing economic challenges, causing the national treasury to lose massive financial resources. Experts have estimated Sudan’s financial losses from smuggled gold at around $7 billion annually—funds that could have been collected through official channels. This negatively impacts the public budget and weakens the government’s ability to fund essential services. It also contributes to the worsening deficit in the balance of payments due to large quantities of gold exiting the country unregistered.
In addition, the widespread smuggling of gold undermines the appeal of the mining sector to both local and foreign investors. hindering efforts to develop this vital sector as one of the pillars of the Sudanese economy.
Many Sudanese living in artisanal mining areas cling to the hope of striking it rich through gold extraction However, rampant smuggling and the diversion of gold into informal markets have only worsened their economic conditions.
Local Miners also face serious health risks due to unregulated mining practices and receive little financial return for the hard labor they put in.
The chemicals used in gold extraction—such as cyanide—pose catastrophic health risks not only to the miners but also to nearby communities living around these sites.
Traditional miners often use mercury to extract about 30% of the gold from the soil, primarily for smuggling purposes. Exposing them to the risk of mercury poisoning
The remaining gold is extracted using cyanide in large-scale industrial plants, which often fail to comply with essential safety and environmental standards.
Who Profits from the Smuggling of Sudanese Gold?
This investigation focuses on five key countries that are likely—directly or indirectly—linked to gold smuggling operations from Sudan. We also take a closer look at the United Arab Emirates, one of the world’s top importers of gold, particularly from Africa.
Figure (3) illustrates the total gold exports from six countries: Sudan, Uganda, Egypt, Chad, Kenya, and South Sudan. The comparison aims to track patterns and shifts in export volumes, particularly during the recent conflict in Sudan.
The data reveals a striking pattern: as Sudan’s official gold exports declined, exports from other countries—most notably Egypt and Uganda—rose sharply during 2023 and 2024. Chad also saw an increase, though to a lesser extent, while this inverse trend does not by itself confirm direct causation, it raises credible suspicions of smuggling routes shifting gold from Sudan into neighboring countries.
This trend will be a central line of inquiry in our investigation, which will be further substantiated through direct interviews aiming to map smuggling routes and quantify the volume of gold being trafficked through them.
Figure No (3): Total Gold Exports from Six Countries: Sudan, Uganda, Egypt, Chad, Kenya, and South Sudan from 2018 to 2024
The Role of the UAE in Receiving and Laundering Smuggled African Gold
Table (1) shows the percentage of gold exports to the UAE out of the total gold exports from the six countries focused on in this study. The data reveal that gold exports from four of these countries — Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, and Chad — are entirely or almost entirely directed to the UAE, and this pattern has persisted throughout the monitoring period from 2018 to 2023. This indicates near-total dominance by the UAE over the gold exiting these countries.
As for the remaining two countries, Egypt and Uganda, they also exported the majority of their gold production to the UAE. In Uganda’s case, all of its gold exports were directed to the UAE until 2022, while Egypt exported more than 50% of its gold production to the UAE in most years — see Figure 4.
Country | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
Sudan (%) | 97.1% | 97.2% | 96.0% | 99.0% | 98.6% | 99.8% |
South sudan (%) | 100% | 98% | 26% | — | 100% | 100% |
Kenya (%) | 50.1% | 24.4% | 13.4% | 49.2% | 59.8% | 89.1% |
Uganda (%) | 99.8% | 96.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 62.3% | 33.8% |
Egypt (%) | 53.4% | 66.8% | 67.8% | 31.8% | 49.5% | 50.1% |
Chad (%) | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
Table No (1): Percentage of gold exports to the UAE from total gold exports (2018 – 2023)
Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity(OEC)
The Role of the UAE in Smuggled Gold Trade
The UAE’s relationship with African gold is not limited to official exports, but it has also become a main destination for smuggled gold. A report by “Swissaid,” published in 2022, indicated that 66.5% of the gold imported by the UAE from Africa — equivalent to 40 tons — was smuggled from African countries. The report stated that the UAE contributes to the “laundering” of gold, as large quantities of smuggled gold acquire legal status once they enter through the UAE.
The report also noted that smuggling on this scale not only causes a loss of tax revenues for countries, but also raises concerns about the existence of an illegal economy that could be exploited for money laundering, funding wars and terrorism, and evading sanctions.
In 2019, the “Reuters” agency published a report titled “Billions of dollars in gold smuggled from Africa,” in which it detailed the UAE’s role as a main destination for gold smuggled from the continent.
The report also pointed to large discrepancies between the figures announced by the UAE regarding gold imports from African countries, and the figures these countries themselves report regarding their exports to the UAE. In some cases, discrepancies reached about $1.3 billion, indicating smuggling or illegal trade activity.
Despite the accusations, the UAE’s Ministry of Economy denied the state’s responsibility for the accuracy of export data from other countries, saying that the UAE cannot be held accountable for export records issued by other governments.
Figure No (4): Total official gold exports to the UAE from Sudan, Egypt, Uganda, Chad, Kenya, and South Sudan during the period from 2018 to 2023
In general, the UAE’s benefit from African gold is evident, as it took advantage of weak oversight in these countries to become the second-largest gold trading hub in the world, with a value exceeding $129 billion and an annual growth rate of 36% in 2023. It also rose to second place globally in gold exports in 2023, according to data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) — see Figure No 5.
Figure (5): Total UAE gold exports between 2018 and 2023
Figure (6): Total UAE gold imports between 2018 and 2023
First Destination: The UAE
Linked to smuggled Sudanese gold, the UAE has also long faced accusations of secretly supplying weapons to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces with weapons via neighboring Chad — accusations that Abu Dhabi has categorically denied. However, a highly classified internal report obtained by The Guardian,revealed several cargo flights from the UAE using transport aircraft on routes that appeared deliberately designed to evade detection as they headed to bases in Chad.. There, arms smuggling operations across the border into Sudan were documented.
Numerous reports and journalistic investigations have revealed that the UAE plays a pivotal role in smuggling Sudanese gold, as large quantities of gold are exported without passing through the official state channels, hindering the Sudanese government’s ability to monitor and profit from gold exports.
According to Dubai Gold Exchange data, the UAE became the second-largest gold exporter in the world in 2023, surpassing the UK.
In 2023, data obtained by Swissaid showed that the UAE’s gold imports from Chad, located on Sudan’s western border, exceeded the country’s estimated maximum gold production capacity by more than twofold. — suggesting that most of these quantities were smuggled across the border.
Mark Ummel, a researcher at Swissaid who monitors gold smuggling from African countries to the UAE, says: “To understand the war in Sudan, we must trace the gold — and we will arrive at the United Arab Emirates”. UN reports revealed that it is supplying the Rapid Support Forces with weapons and other necessities, often under the guise of humanitarian aid.
Second Destination: Russia
In a related context, there were close ties between the Rapid Support Forces and the former Russian Wagner Group, which played a key role in smuggling Sudanese gold in exchange for providing military supplies to the Rapid Support Forces in the early stages of the war. Following the death of Wagner’s founder Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, the group’s operations in Africa were reorganized under the Russian Ministry of Defense and are now known as the Africa Corps.
Through shell companies and complex financial networks, Sudanese gold is smuggled — sometimes with the help of the Wagner Group’s network and their successor— from Darfur. It is believed that the Wagner Group and now Africa Corps, linked to the Russian Kremlin, previously helped secure border crossings and extract gold, as well as contributed to training and equipping the Rapid Support Forces with military gear.
Some UN reports stated that shipments of heavy weapons — such as man-portable surface-to-air missile systems — were sent via Libya thanks to Wagner and Marshal Khalifa Haftar to the Rapid Support Forces.
From here, it becomes clear how the phenomenon of gold smuggling — specifically from Darfur to Chad and then to the UAE, and gold smuggling through the Russian Wagner Group — has helped sustain the current conflict, where gold is used as a raw resource traded in exchange for weapons, equipment, and military support used in the ongoing war.
Active Mines during the Two Years of War
A former official in the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company told “Beam Reports” about the areas where Gold mining is currently active — in government-controlled areas in the north and east of southern Sudan, and in areas controlled by armed groups in western Sudan.
The active areas in northern and eastern Sudan include: (Al-Ansari, Jibal Al-Nimr, Nouraya, Al-Abidiya, Abuhamad, and Halfa).
The largest active gold mines currently include the mines of Ariab, Qabqaba, the Maghribya mines, Al-Ulaqi, Dalgo, Al-Duwishat, Orshab, Redhaa, and Kush in Wadi Al-Ashar, in northern and eastern Sudan, while the Sango mines are the most prominent in far southwest Sudan.
The source considered the main reasons leading to gold smuggling in Sudan to include: state policies, lack of trust in the government itself, pricing and refining differences, in addition to currency collapse, the internal situation, blockade, banking policies — and the use of gold to purchase weapons. The distance from production areas to the center is also a significant factor.
In response to a question about the Sudanese government’s efforts to combat gold smuggling and the most prominent steps it has taken during different periods, he said the government currently buys gold at a price higher than the exchange price as an incentive rate, He clarified, saying : “Unfortunately, the Government itself is the biggest Gold Smuggler”.
Active Gold Smuggling Routes in Darfur
After the outbreak of war in Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) took control of most areas of the Darfur region, which enabled them to control gold production, smuggling, and to dominate its trade entirely.
Gold production operations are concentrated in areas under RSF control — in the Jebel Amer mines in North Darfur and mines spread across the Songo area in the far south of South Darfur state — from where it is smuggled via local routes and then out of the country, reaching its final destination in the United Arab Emirates.
The gold smuggling routes begin from Jebel Amer in North Darfur, passing through several small areas, reaching the Sudanese city of Tina, and from there to the Chadian city of Tina, where the smuggled gold from Sudan is received by companies and traders who export it as if it were gold produced in Chad After reaching the capital N’Djamena, it is exported to its final destination from N’Djamena Airport to Dubai Airport in the United Arab Emirates, where it is finally settled.
Gold trader (Mohammed) said that production in the Amer mines occurs in two stages; pointing out that the first stage is carried out by citizens in a traditional manner, and then after the gold is processed in the quarries, it comes under the control of Al-Junaid Company, owned by the RSF, where the gold is processed using cyanide.
He said that the RSF smuggles gold through Libya to a limited extent, while most of it currently goes to Chad. Before the war, the RSF used to smuggle it through the Sudanese capital, Khartoum.
He explained that the preferred smuggling route through North Darfur is the land road via the Kornoi area in North Darfur, then to the Sudanese city of Tina, then to the Chadian city of Tina, and from there to the Chadian cities of Abeche and N’Djamena.
He confirmed that all these routes are not taken in regular ways, and every time the timing and route to a particular place is changed amid maximum security measures, in many cases, the usual roads and routes are bypassed or changed.
“Smugglers avoid entering big towns, they just pass through or around them. The armed smugglers use motorcycles and move at night. After entering Chad, they do not face problems related to obtaining official papers, as they obtain official documents through gold companies inside Chad. The government itself contributes to keeping the situation as it is for its own interest, by turning a blind eye to all that,” says (Mohammed).
The Jebel Amer area is located west of Kabkabiya city in North Darfur and east of El Geneina, the capital of West Darfur, where many mines are spread. The production process involves citizens extracting gold from the wells, then it goes to traditional mills and is washed with mercury.
“As for the cyanide extraction stage, it is controlled by the RSF, who rely on it, and they also confiscate the “karta” — which is the gold mining residues or the tailings from the miners” he adds.
The largest gold mines in South Darfur state are located in the far south of the state, in the Songo area and the Kafia Kingi area near the border with South Sudan. These mines are completely under the control of the RSF.
In the Songo area, there are a number of mines, the largest of which is the Agbash mine, from which gold is smuggled to Chad and South Sudan through several localities in South Darfur, reaching El Geneina, then to Adré in Chad and other border areas, passing through the Umm Labasa area in South Darfur, the trader explains.
The smuggling parties use secret routes, as traders do not disclose their paths. Some smugglers go through the main road linking the cities of Nyala–Nierteti–Zalingei, reaching El Geneina, and from there they cross into Chadian lands through Adré.
As for the South Sudan route, gold enters from the Kafia Kingi area into South Sudanese territory, though not in large quantities like the gold smuggled to Chad According to (Mohammed), when it comes to South Sudan, some Somali traders purchase and collect smuggled gold, which is then sent through various routes to Kenya. From there, it is transported to the United Arab Emirates via intermediaries based in Nairobi and Mombasa, with the UAE serving as the final destination.
Sudanese gold is also smuggled from South Sudan through the Uganda route via the land border on a continuous basis, but not in large quantities in a single smuggling operation, which does not exceed more than one kilogram. And through the Kafia Kingi and Songo areas in South Darfur state — where several mines are located, including the Agbash and Trisa mines, and other small areas — there are more than 10 mines and fewer than 20.
“In the past, forces of the First Vice President of South Sudan, Riek Machar, were present near the Kafia Kingi area, where there are interconnected mines that even extend across the border into South Sudan and they are still operational,” says Mohammed. He pointed out that gold produced in the Boro area of South Sudan is resold in the Kafia Kingi area.
East Kafia Kingi mine
New mine northeast of Kafia Kingi
The weakness of the South Sudan route compared to the Chad route is due to the high corruption and fragile security in the country, according to Mohammed, who said he contacted ministers at the beginning of the war to discuss the possibility of the South Sudanese government benefiting from gold by securing traders and routes to curb gold smuggling.
Mohammed added, “In South Sudan, if you leave the Kafia Kingi area, you’ll have to pay very large sums to reach safely—and that’s if you’re not scammed,” noting that this makes it difficult to carry large quantities of gold due to the security chaos, even if you carry official papers, other security officers will often not recognize them, explaining that all these factors—plus the high taxes—make smuggling difficult.
He continued, “This makes the Chad route better for gold smuggling, plus the return trip from mining areas to trading hubs in Chad is substantial due to the ability to exchange gold for other goods”.
But this is not the case with South Sudan due to the lack of quality commodities that can be exported. Also, exchanging goods with Uganda is a lengthy process that can take around a month, which is not profitable for traders. That’s why the gold smuggling routes to Chad are the most favorable for traders—they take no more than 4–5 days, he adds.
However, three sources from the Al-Junaid Company affiliated with the RSF, revealed an active gold smuggling route from South Darfur State via the city of Raja in South Sudan, which borders Sudan, using airplanes.
One of the three sources told Agence France-Presse last March that the southern border region of Darfur alone produces no less than 150 kilograms of gold per month.
According to the source, the gold is first sent to an airport in the city of Raja in South Sudan, “then flown to Uganda and Kenya, and then to the UAE”—a route he himself took.
The three sources—former engineers at the Al-Junaid Company—estimated that the company’s wartime profits are no less than one billion dollars annually, based on approximate gold production and pricing.
Also in South Darfur, the city of Nyala has become a very large gold market, where buying and selling take place in undisclosed areas. The gold is then collected in the market and smuggled through the same routes.
The damage from Sudan’s gold mines is not only economic but also has devastating environmental consequences due to the use of hazardous materials in gold extraction. But this risk is amplified in the gold mines of South Darfur State, where these operations take place in and around the Radom Nature Reserve.
South Kordofan
There are several mines in South Kordofan State in southwestern Sudan. Control over them is split between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, where there’s a route for smuggling gold produced there through artisanal mining to foreign countries.
The SPLM-N, which has been fighting the Sudanese government since 2011, controls several gold mines, the most famous and largest of which is in the Al-Leri area, where gold is extracted by miners under the SPLM-N’s control.
Mohammed says the production areas in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan are under the control of SPLM-N leader Abdelaziz al-Hilu. He pointed out that production in South Kordofan is very traditional, and there are not many mechanisms to increase output. Nevertheless, citizens work through traditional methods to extract gold as the area is rich in it, while Al-Hilu purchases the gold and monopolizes its trade.
However, Al-Hilu allows some citizens to mine and invest in gold during periods when there are no armed clashes, such as the rainy season. He also permits the demobilization of soldiers to engage in gold mining during times of calm.
He continued, “The SPLM-N markets its gold in Kenya,” explaining that the production method has not been affected by the war because it doesn’t depend on large machinery.
The gold is smuggled via planes that land in the area, with most of the gold produced going to Kenya, while a small portion crosses the border into South Sudan, according to Mohammed.
North and East Sudan
There are a number of mines in North and East Sudan in the Red Sea, River Nile, and Northern states, where all these mines fall under the control of the Sudanese government. However, gold smuggling has continued since the outbreak of the war to Sudan’s northern neighbor, the Arab Republic of Egypt.
There are also gold processing mills in the Abu Hamad area in the River Nile State, which is considered the main hub for gold smuggling operations through the land borders to Egypt as the final destination.
Originally, the gold smuggling route through the desert of the Abu Hamad area into Egypt is a human smuggling route, or for illegal migration to Egypt, which has increased after the outbreak of the war in Sudan.
The area is full of professional smugglers with longstanding experience in desert paths, used for human smuggling, arms smuggling, and other illegal goods in previous periods. They use Japanese four by four cars for all smuggling operations.
The smuggling route begins from Abu Hamad through the barren desert until it reaches near the border with Egypt, where the Sudanese smugglers stop at those points near the border, and then the Egyptian smugglers come to take the smuggled gold. Traders and smugglers in Sudan, within certain networks linked to the government, are involved in this operation, but not extensively.
Trader (Mohamed) says that gold smuggling through northern Sudan to Egypt takes place along human smuggling routes, particularly through areas like Shalateen and near the Argeen border crossing between Sudan and Egypt. From there people move to nearby governorates and then further into Egypt. He points out that these routes are more organized, with communications coordinated in advance with government bodies and border intelligence in both Sudan and Egypt, who are aware of the operations.
Regarding the smuggling hub in the Abu Hamad area — home to the largest gold markets in River Nile State where processing mills are located — he noted that smuggling operations often begin there. Smugglers purchase gold and move through several areas toward the Egyptian border. He explained that the smuggling routes are deliberately unstructured to avoid detection. Upon reaching the border with Egypt, the smugglers abandon their vehicles and proceed on foot for some distance before taking taxis, where other smugglers are ready and waiting for them on the other side.
He confirms that the gold smuggling routes to Egypt are the same as those for human smuggling, but he says they are more organized with formal arrangements in place to facilitate the process — including the use of the same taxis at the border. He also pointed out that some traders receive gold in Port Sudan’s souq shaabi (traditional market), from where it is sent to the Egyptian city of Aswan. He explained that these traders travel to Egypt and find their gold has already arrived in Aswan, relying on mutual trust, unlike what happens among traders in Darfur.
He said that the quantities of gold coming from northern Sudan that enter Egypt are significantly larger compared to other smuggling routes in the western part of the country. He explained that the flow is much easier due to a high level of organization, with official bodies providing protection all the way to Cairo, unlike the Darfur routes where there are problems and a lack of security.
As for the intervention of official entities in smuggling operations, he says there are two types: one part receives instructions from higher officials and carries them out, and another part takes bribes from traders to facilitate the operation. He stressed that the officials themselves do not get involved in the operation directly.
Nevertheless, the conflict continues in North and East Sudan along the human smuggling routes between security authorities and gold smugglers.
An eyewitness who traveled to Egypt through the smuggling routes—starting from Atbara, through the desert, and reaching Egypt via the occupied Halayeb Triangle—told Beam Reports that the vehicle’s driver and another person with him were armed and carried gold, copper, and smuggled weapons.
“The source confirmed that the smuggling team was entirely replaced after the vehicle entered Egyptian territory”.
In contrast, the source confirmed that the authorities thwarted an attempt to smuggle more than 100 kilograms of gold loaded on a vehicle in the city of Atbara, northern Sudan, which was on its way to Egypt.
Two investigations by “Middle East Eye” published in November 2024 and January 2025, revealed the ongoing smuggling of gold from Sudan to Egypt during the ongoing war in the country.
Gold Buyers
Trader (Mohammed) says the matter of buying and selling gold is subject to the control of commercial capital, confirming that neither the Sudanese government nor the Chadian government oversees it, and that no organized bodies are involved in this matter.
He added: “They are traders who have capital, they buy gold either from Nyala, El Fasher, El Daein, or Kafia Kingi. They carry the gold themselves and go with it to Chad through intermediaries/Brokers in Chad, such as registered companies that pay taxes for them and then receive the gold and take it to the Emirates (UAE).”
He confirmed that the UAE has companies in Chad that buy the gold and obtain papers for it as if it is Chadian gold, clarifying that no authorities interfere in the work of these companies while gathering gold on the borders, especially in the border zones between Sudan and Chad.
He pointed out that the traders secure the gold in their own ways, and in some cases, they rent groups from the Rapid Support Forces. Some of them own weapons and four-wheel-drive vehicles, and they arrive in an organized, arranged, and secure manner. Then they enter Chad — either they sell the gold to Chadian intermediaries/Brokers or return to the border to exchange their money and then return to Sudan.
Sudanese gold smuggled to the UAE arrives with Chadian papers and is considered Chadian production. The same applies to Egypt, where it becomes the country of origin — as well as Libya, Kenya, and South Sudan — where Sudan is never mentioned.
He confirmed that the regulatory bodies in the countries where Sudanese gold arrives can identify, through the (codes) in the gold, that it is Sudanese gold or that it came from Sudan. Even when it enters the testing machines in Dubai, UAE, it is easily recognized as Sudanese gold, even if it comes with Chadian documents.
In South Sudan, Somali traders control the purchase of gold from the Naam market and Juba in small quantities. It is then sent to Kenya due to the large Somali population there and the existence of a large parallel market where buying and selling occur, and it is exported to Europe, East Asia, and Canada, with prices higher than in Dubai and the outlet there.
He continued that most gold buyers are Sudanese or Somali (third-tier traders), where there are traders with more capital in Juba who buy the gold from them. These then resell it again to Somalis in Nairobi or Mombasa.
Trader (Mohammed) explained that some of them sell gold in Dubai due to their dealings with companies there, but not in large quantities, estimating the amounts to not exceed 2–3 kilograms per person per day. The rest of the gold is sold to bigger traders in Kenya. He said these also have their own methods for exporting it abroad (also Somalis).
Smuggled gold reaches East Africa via a very long route, especially the land route from northern Sudan, where there are major difficulties.
At the beginning of the war, there were groups with ties to government circles in Uganda, some of them prominent individuals from the regime of former president Omar al-Bashir, in addition to diplomats, where considerable quantities were smuggled through Port Sudan airport.
There is no central gold market in Uganda, and the market is weak, but there is a gold refinery belonging to companies that process gold from Congo and the Central African Republic.
Nevertheless, quantities of Sudanese gold reach Uganda, though they are small — known to be less than one kilogram — clarifying that large quantities are usually organized.
There are also gold producers in northern Sudan or the Nuba Mountains and Kafia Kingi regions who have sons in Uganda who carry small amounts between 100–300 grams, pass them through the gates, and sell them in Uganda.
In an interview with a fellow researcher from the Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) in Uganda, Paul Twebaze explained that after conducting studies to evaluate revenues from minerals — especially gold — it was noted that gold exports through Uganda have continued to rise since 2019. In the fiscal year 2019/2020, Uganda earned 19 billion Ugandan Schillings from gold exports, and then a very significant jump in the following year, as revenues rose to 202 billion.
He added: “Exports are still increasing, but the problem is that the export volume is rising while production is declining according to official sources. Here, the question arises: where is this extra gold coming from? because we produce less, but export more” He added that when the gold reaches Uganda, it is refined here in our refineries, then sent to Dubai to be sold in the market there.
War Financing Through Gold Smuggling
Gold smuggling has accompanied Sudan for many years, but after the outbreak of war in Sudan in April 2023 between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, the phenomenon of gold smuggling has worsened due to several factors — most notably: military spending, security liquidity, and external greed arising from the situation in Sudan and the security disintegration caused by the war.
Due to these factors, the smuggling phenomenon has worsened in efforts to fund the war for the Sudanese government and the armed groups, most notably the Rapid Support Forces.
Global Witness published a detailed investigation about how the Rapid Support Forces, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), are financed and the financial and economic networks supporting them.
The investigation shed light on the methods these forces use to secure money and expand military operations and how these financial networks affect political stability in Sudan.
Among the methods of financing seized by the Rapid Support Forces to support their military activity was gold. The gold mining areas in Darfur, especially the Jebel Amer region, are under the control of the Rapid Support Forces.
The Rapid Support Forces smuggle gold from the production areas to Chad, and then these shipments of smuggled gold continue their journey to the UAE.
It is likely, according to the investigation, that a large portion of the production from areas under the control of the Sudanese Armed Forces was smuggled to Egypt, but no accurate data is available on the quantity of gold arriving from Sudan to Egypt.
Figures from the Central Bank of Sudan indicate that the country exported only 16 million dollars worth of gold to its northern neighbor in 2024. However, estimates suggest that unofficial and smuggled gold exports to Egypt represent around 60% of the production from the Northern State, River Nile State, and Red Sea State — which increased their production after the war to cover war financing.
Gold plays a pivotal role in financing the conflict in Sudan, as gold is smuggled through defined routes in the north, west, and south of the country, and from there, the smuggled gold finds its way to countries such as the UAE, Russia, and others — which have been proven to be involved in the ongoing war in Sudan.
A report by the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan highlighted the severe impact of gold smuggling on the conflict, emphasizing its critical role in financing the war, particularly through the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). The report detailed how the RSF has used gold smuggling networks, especially routes through the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to fund its military operations and acquire weapons. It identified the UAE as a primary destination for smuggled Sudanese gold, noting that these routes are often used as a cover for broader logistical support, including weapons shipments to the RSF. The report also noted connections between the RSF’s gold trade and the Wagner Group (now operating as Africa Corps), underscoring the complex geopolitical dimensions of Sudan’s conflict.
